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THE NEW FACULTY OF LAW at Ryerson University has joined in the debate over 
what skills are necessary for legal practice and whether law schools should teach 
those skills.1 While its focus on practice readiness may be notable, what is truly 
interesting about Ryerson’s curriculum is the central role that technology plays in 
the formulation of practice readiness.2 Te curriculum includes mandatory courses 
in legal technologies, coding, innovation, and technological entrepreneurialism. 
Ryerson has taken on the responsibility of preparing its students to engage with 
technology as a central requirement of legal practice. 
While practice readiness is the goal, this article provides insight into why 
Ryerson’s approach is sensitive to the diference between learning to use technology 
and learning how to challenge its efects.3 New technologies can deliver positive 
legal change, including enhanced accessibility, mobility, and knowledge. However, 
they can also unravel the norms, processes, and relationships at the heart of legal 
organization. Tis is especially cogent where individuals and entities are newly 
empowered or disempowered in relation to each other. As a result, teaching 
students to think critically about the production of law through technology 
requires some further thinking about how lawyers can become critical purveyors 
of the technology they and their clients will use. 
Tis article addresses this pedagogic need by putting systemic thinking about 
technology at the centre of professional legal education. Learning from deep 
descriptions of how technology impacts law’s formulation, a systemic approach 
identifes the ways that digitization and data management are implicated in 
1. See Canadian Common Law Program Approval Committee, Report on Application by Ryerson 
University for Approval of Proposed Law School Program (Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada, 2017) online (pdf ): <fsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Approval-Committee-
Ryerson-Report-Dec-2017-C.pdf >; Professional Development & Competence Committee, 
Ryerson University Proposed Integrated Practice Curriculum, by Margaret Drent (Law Society 
of Ontario, 25 April 2019), online (pdf ): <s3.amazonaws.com/tld-documents.llnassets. 
com/0011000/11880/convocation-april-2019-professionaldevelopmentandcompetencecom 
mitteereport.pdf >. 
2. See Daniel Bates, “Are Digital Natives Equipped to Conquer the Legal Landscape” (2013) 
13 Legal Info Mgmt 172; Anne Binsfeld, “New Barristers’ Information Literacy Challenges 
as they Transition from Education to the Workplace” (2019) 19 Legal Info Mgmt 36; 
Simon Canick, “Technology in Law School Curriculum” (2014) 42 Capital UL Rev 
663 at 663, 665-68; Craig T Smith, “Technology and Legal Education: Negotiating the 
Shoals of Technocentrism, Technophobia, and Indiference” (2002) 1 J Assoc Leg Writing 
Directors 247 at 247-48. 
3. See Mireille Hildebrandt, “Law as Computation in the Era of Artifcial Legal Intelligence: 
Speaking Law to the Power of Statistics” (2018) 68 UTLJ 12 at 14 [Hildebrandt, “Law”]; 
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the organization of people in relation to law.4 As explored below, a systemic 
approach attempts to achieve a goal more complex than teaching the use of 
emergent technologies or how to improve efciencies through standardization 
and systemization.5 Rather, it seeks to address questions about whether and how 
practitioners will be well-placed to address the tensions that technology will 
produce for law and legal practice. Once one comprehends that technology is 
used to produce law, then one sees that what is at stake is the role that lawyers 
play in understanding those technologies. Terefore, in addition to acquiring new 
skills, students should be expected to analyze how a given technology disrupts the 
role that lawyers play in the interpretation, application, and delivery of law. 
Te paper addresses these issues in two major parts. In Part I, I link the need 
for curricular reform to the recognition that technology has begun to disrupt the 
legal profession. I explain that what will be changed by emerging technologies is 
who will provide legal services to the public. However, my summary of curricular 
reforms highlights how little legal education has been able to incorporate this 
fundamental change into teaching. 
In Part II, I outline the problem with this disconnect between legal practice 
and legal education as a gap in preparing lawyers for efective legal representation. 
In doing so, I explain the rationale for using a systemic approach in law school 
curricula as a way to transcend intransigence over teaching technology. I then 
propose a systemic pedagogy that incorporates technology into legal education 
as a tool, as a discourse, and as a social lens.6 Tis pedagogy draws on two of 
Ryerson’s teaching pillars (user-based learning and innovation-based learning) to 
illustrate its blended turn to technology as a facet of practice readiness. 
4. Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind, Te Future of the Professions: How Technology Will 
Transform the Work of Human Experts (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
5. For thinking on the topic of systemic legal education, I am indebted to Harry Arthurs, 
Roderick Macdonald, Jason MacLean, and Rosalie Jukier. See Harry Arthurs, “Law and 
Learning in an Era of Globalization” (2009) 10 German LJ 629 [Arthurs, “Law”]; Harry 
Arthurs, “Madly Of in One Direction: McGill’s New Integrated, Polyjural, Transsystemic 
Law Programme” (2005) 50 McGill LJ 707; Roderick A Macdonald & Jason MacLean “No 
Toilets in the Park” (2005) 50 McGill LJ 721; Rosalie Jukier, “Transnationalizing the Legal 
Curriculum: How to Teach What We Live” (2006) 56 J Leg Educ 172. 
6. In this I rely on the inclusive defnition of technology as systems. See Val Dusek, Philosophy 
of Technology: An Introduction (Blackwell, 2005) at 26-37 (all systems in which physical 
hardware and rules are applied in ways that implicate the organization of people in 
relation to law). 









I. THE DISRUPTION OF LEGAL PRACTICE AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION 
A. THE DISRUPTION OF PRACTICE 
Te scholarship and commentary on technology and legal practice seems 
relatively consistent in its message that the practice of law is currently undergoing 
or is about to undergo a period of massive disruption as a result of technological 
innovation.7 Legal commentators have borrowed the term “disruption” from 
economists to describe the development of technologies that contain the potential 
to make legal services much more afordable, and therefore accessible, to a greater 
number of people.8 While it is unclear whether clients have benefted from a 
marked reduction in cost or accessibility, this section explains why it is clear 
that emerging technologies will alter who or what provides those legal services. 
Tis section outlines those changes in order to identify downstream pressures 
on the academy. 
Much of the legal scholarship attributes the disruptive use of legal technology 
to the economic crisis of 2008 and the decline in demand for expensive legal 
services.9 Economic changes in this period bolstered customer expectations for 
fxed fee arrangements, discounts, and technological efciencies.10 At the same 
time, global demands for more innovative, technologically savvy, and nimble 
approaches to managing interactions across jurisdictions and between sectors 
grew. Te efect of these changes has been to pressure the legal profession to 
change how service is provided. As the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) warned, 
7. See generally John O McGinnis & Russell G Pearce, “Te Great Disruption: How Machine 
Intelligence will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Services” (2014) 82 
Fordham L Rev 3041; Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future
(Oxford University Press, 2013) [Susskin, Tomorrow’s Lawyers]; Raymond H Brescia et al, 
“Embracing Disruption: How Technological Change in the Delivery of Legal Services Can 
Improve Access to Justice” (2014) 78 Alb L Rev 553 [Brescia et al, “Embracing Disruption”]; 
Clayton M Christensen, Te Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms 
To Fail (Harvard College, 1997); Jordan Furlong, “Te Pivot Generation: How Tomorrow’s 
Lawyers Will Help Build a New and Better Legal Market” (2017) 50 Sufolk UL Rev 415. 
8. See Clay Christensen, “Disruptive Innovation Explained” (6 March 2012), online (video): 
Harvard Business Review <hbr.org/2012/03/disruptive-innovation-explained>. 
9. For a discussion of disruption as a term in the legal context, see Brian Sheppard, “Incomplete 
Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services” (2015) Mich State L Rev 1797. 
10. Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers, supra note 7 at 3-5. 
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the “legal industry in Canada is not immune to the major macro trends that are 
transforming virtually every industry in the world.”11 
For the purposes of this discussion, disruptive legal technologies can be 
divided into two types: technologies that create efciencies for professional 
lawyers and technologies that create efciencies for non-professional users (i.e., 
clients, government agencies, arbitrators, mediators, et cetera). 
John O. McGinnis and Russell G. Pearce identifed fve key areas of legal practice 
in which machine intelligence will dramatically alter practice in the near future: 
“discovery, legal search, document generation, brief generation, and [case 
prediction].”12 Several machine learning technologies developed in Canada, such 
as Blue J Legal and Clause Hound, typify this market.13 Tese technologies ofer 
predictive analysis backed by analytics, as well as plain language searching and 
automated document production. 
Similar types of efciencies in assembling and analyzing client data are expected 
to be achieved through machine learning for other undertakings. For instance, 
e-discovery provides automated analyses of large data sets needed for evidence 
in litigation and corporate matters. Blockchain uses systems that independently 
verify identities, ownership, registration, and legal existence in secured and 
commercial transactions, real estate transactions, and dispute resolution. 
Tese technologies are diferentiated from earlier technological changes by 
their reliance on machine learning to alter who (or what) provides the service to 
clients.14 Analyses that might have taken years of experience and hours of human 
work to produce are now generated by software programs. Tasks previously 
undertaken by lawyers to transfer assets, ensure validity in a commercial 
transaction, or liaise with clearing agencies, depositories, registries, and regulators 
are now undertaken by programs that replace the trust or validation of a lawyer. 
Consequently, the ability to access legal knowledge is expected to increase and the 
costs of accessing it are expected to decrease. 
11. Richard Susskind, Te Future of Legal Services in Canada: Trends and Issues (Canadian Bar 
Association, June 2013) at 4. 
12. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 7 at 3043. 
13. For an early comparison between these expert systems and AI, see Richard Susskind, “Expert 
Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential Approach to Artifcial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning” 
(1986) 49 Mod L Rev 168 at 169. 
14. Sheppard, supra note 9. 




Te potential impacts of automation on professional practice are immense. 
For example, commentators have asked where responsibility lies when 
non-lawyers or lawyers use technology to provide legal services but do not possess 
the analytical tools required to assess its adequacy.15 One answer is that these 
technologies will be blocked from the legal market where deemed to provide 
unlicensed legal advice, or their scope of use will be limited.16 Others disagree and 
see their uptake continuing apace with few implications for liability. For example, 
McGinnis and Pearce argue that, while unauthorized practice statutes pose some 
barriers to machine intelligence, standards for professional ethics, market forces, 
and scope of uptake instead predict increased reliance on technology.17 A third 
body of commentators has called for an entirely new model for assigning liability 
to the machines themselves.18 Ultimately, these debates reveal that professional 
liability and responsibility resulting from technology will remain ambiguous in 
the near future. 
Similarly, reliance on predictive programs is diferent in nature from the 
use of web-based repositories because such programs remove some of the labour 
previously needed to provide opinions about the law. Tis development is 
expected to disrupt both legal training and the distribution of income within the 
practice of law in the near future.19 Labour normally carried out by junior lawyers 
and those who provide routine legal services could be replaced by technologies 
that write research memos, draft simple wills, manage house closings, and register 
15. See Dana A Remus, “Te Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding” (2014) 99 Iowa L Rev 
1691. For discussion of the issue in the United States, see Larry E Ribstein, “Te Death of 
Big Law” (2010) Wis L Rev 749 at 807-808; Ray Worthy Campbell, “Rethinking Regulation 
and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market” (2012) 9 NYU J L & Bus 1 at 45-51. 
16. See e.g. Gillian Hadfeld, “Legal Barriers to Innovation: Te Growing Economic Cost 
of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets” (2008) 60 Stan L Rev 1689 at 
1720-21, 1724-25. 
17. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 7 at 3059-64. 
18. See e.g. Ignacio N Cofone, “Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the Law of AI” (2018) 21 
Stan Tech L Rev 167; Dafni Lima, “Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable: Artifcial 
Intelligence and the Challenge of Criminal Law” (2018) 69 SCL Rev 677. 
19. See Jon M Garon, “Legal Education in Disruption: Te Headwinds and Tailwinds of 
Technology” (2013) 45 Conn L Rev 1165; Jordan Furlong, “Te Evolution of the Legal 
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documents.20 As a result, the structural use of junior lawyers within frms may 
change, as will the method for obtaining skills needed for mid-career practice.21 
 2. EFFICIENCIES FOR NON-LAWYERS 
In addition to technologies for lawyers, the quest for efciencies has led to the 
introduction of automated systems in key felds where individual judgement is 
time and risk intensive. Tese technologies lower the cost of service. However, 
they also disrupt responsibility for decisions and raise more fundamental questions 
about how lawyers can efectively represent clients within these systems.22 
For example, recent studies have documented the use of predictive analytics 
by legal professionals in assessing bail as well as assessing the risk of recidivism 
in pre-trial and sentencing decisions.23 However, algorithms directed at bail 
decisions in the United States have been almost twice as likely to falsely label 
Black prisoners as being at high risk for re-ofending than white prisoners.24 
Moreover, similar technologies are being used by non-lawyers to predict hot 
spots for increased surveillance and to promote intensive police presence.25 
Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst explain how AI technologies like these allow 
powerful actors to make algorithmic decisions that have a disparate impact on 
subordinated groups.26 
A recent study of Canada’s immigration and refugee system shows automated 
decision processes are being used by regulatory decision-makers to classify 
immigration cases, triage applications, generate scores, produce factors to support 
reasoning, identify cases for investigation, and provide recommendations for or 
20. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 7. 
21. On the reduction of those providing bespoke services, see Sheppard, supra note 9 at 1877-79; 
William E Foster & Andrew Lawson, “When to Praise the Machine: Te Promise and Perils 
of Automated Transactional Drafting” (2017) 69 South Carolina L Rev 597 at 633. 
22. For warnings, see Ian Kerr, “Prediction, pre-emption, presumption: Te path of law after 
the computational turn” in Mireille Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries, eds, Privacy and Due 
Process After the Computational Turn (Routledge, 2013) 91; Michael Geist & Milana Homsi, 
“Outsourcing our Privacy?: Privacy and Security in a Borderless Commercial World” 
(2005) 54 UNBLJ 272. 
23. Julia Angwin et al, “Machine Bias” (23 May 2016), online: ProPublica <www.propublica.org/ 
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing>. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Andrew G Ferguson, Te Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race and the Future of Law 
Enforcement (NYU Press, 2017). 
26. “Big Data’s Disparate Impact” (2016) 104 Cal L Rev 671 at 675. 











against approvals.27 Te authors of the report forecast feedback loops that create 
an environment ripe for algorithmic discrimination. A feedback loop occurs 
when machine learning propagates biases built into identifying characteristics 
such as, income, race, residency, insurance profles.28 Tese programs purport to 
compute the truthfulness of a refugee’s story based on indicators derived from 
past applications and outcomes. However, in doing so, they build in suppositions 
that are false, misleading, or addressable, had they been raised in person.29 
Altogether diferent concerns have arisen in the use of automated vehicles, 
such as self-driving cars and autonomous drones. Who should be responsible for 
accidents caused by self-driving cars if the decision-making matrix was premised 
on choices authorized by regulation? Can the owner of AI car technology be 
responsible for an accident, if the programming only permitted limited choice? 
Tese types of questions are even more cogent where threat to life is built into 
design. For example, challenges to human rights clearly arise where autonomous 
drones are used to carry out surveillance and warfare.30 However, these issues 
become more complex when examining how these tools are used by state agents, 
such as the Coast Guard, in counternarcotics.31 As Jack Balkin noted, AI presents 
new problems for how to distribute rights and responsibilities that arise from 
actions of non-human entities as well as AI agents.32 Tese studies provide a 
glimpse into how the medium can transfer decision-making to automated 
systems and therefore afect the authority to articulate law. Moreover, the removal 
of humans from individualised decision making creates an accountability gap 
that has little parallel in previous theorizing about institutions. Tis form of 
proxy discrimination is difcult to detect but also difcult to amend, given how 
programs are discursively positioned to provide neutral and objective outputs.33 
27. See Petra Molnar & Lex Gill, “Bots at the Gate: A Human Rights Analysis of Automated 
Decision-Making in Canada’s Immigration and Refugee System” (University of 
Toronto, 2018). 
28. See Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Treatens Democracy (Crown, 2016). 
29. Ibid at 33-36. 
30. See Yoram Dinstein, “Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law” in Wolf 
Heintschel von Heinegg, Robert Frau & Tassilo Singer, eds, Dehumanization of Warfare
(Springer, 2018) 15. 
31. See Michael Sinclair, “Proposed Rules to Determine the Legal Use of Autonomous 
and Semi-Autonomous Platforms in Domestic U.S. Law Enforcement” (2018) 20 
NCJ L & Tech 1. 
32. “Te Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45 at 46. 
33. See Joshua A Kroll et al, “Accountable Algorithms” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 633 (limitations 
on transparency). 
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B. THE DISRUPTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
Despite the proliferation of legal technologies, there is criticism that legal 
educators have not yet looked inward to analyse their own role and responsibilities 
in preparing lawyers to practice in this brand-new world. Critics have raised 
concerns that students are not using relevant technologies in the classroom,34 nor 
are they being prepared to use technology in practice.35 Tese critics highlight 
that there remains an unmet need to teach future lawyers how to understand, 
analyse, explain, and control legal systems.36  In short, there is little evidence that 
legal education has undergone any widespread disruption.37 
Naturally, curriculum reform to include technology has begun. Many law 
schools have added some technical components within courses or provided elective 
courses on technology and the practice of law.38 For instance, virtual learning 
systems, computer supported peer review,39  and presentation technologies40  
have been used in some courses to alter assessment but also to teach students 
about professional communication and collaboration.41 Similar eforts have been 
undertaken in legal research and writing,42 interviewing, communicating,43 and 
34. Canick, supra note 2 at 663, 665-68; Smith, supra note 2 at 247-48. 
35. See Daniel Bates, “Are ‘Digital Natives’ Equipped to Conquer the Legal Landscape?” 
(2013) 13 Leg Info Mgmt 172; Anne Binsfeld, “New Barristers’ Information Literacy 
Challenges as Tey Transition from Education to the Workplace” (2019) 19 Leg Info Mgmt 
36; Barbara L Bernier & F Dennis Green, “Law School Reset–Pedagogy, Andragogy & 
Second Life” in Oliver Goodenough & Marc Lauritsen, eds, Educating the Digital Lawyer 
(LexisNexis, 2012) 11-1. 
36. For new eforts at analyzing legal text, see Wolfgang Alschner, Julia Seiermann & Dmitriy 
Skougarevskiy, “Text of Trade Agreements (ToTA)—A Structured Corpus for the 
Text-as-Data Analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements” (2018) 15 J Empirical Leg Stud 648. 
37. Garon, supra note 19; Brescia et al, “Embracing Disruption”, supra note 7. 
38. For an excellent bibliography of eforts in the United States, see Pearl Goldman, “Legal 
Education and Technology III: An Annotated Bibliography” (2019) 111 Law Libr J 325. 
39. See Kevin Ashley & Ilya Goldin, “Computer-Supported Peer Review in a Law School 
Context” (2015) University of Pittsburg Legal Studies Research Working Paper No 2015-24. 
40. See Charles Barker & Claire Sparrow, “Technology and Presentation Skills Teaching: Activity 
Teory as a Tool for the Design and Evaluation of Strategies for the Use of Video as a 
Learning Tool in Presentation Skills Teaching” (2016) 7 Eur J L & Tech 1. 
41. See Anneka Ferguson & Elizabeth Lee, “Desperately Seeking … Relevant Assessment? 
A Case Study on the Potential for Using Online Simulated Group Based Learning to Create 
Sustainable Assessment Practices” (2012) 22 Leg Econ Rev 121. 
42. See Paul Maharg, “Convergence and Fragmentation: Legal Research, Legal Informatics and 
Legal Education” (2014) 5 Eur J L & Tech 1. 
43. See Ann Tanaraj, “Making the Case for a Digital Lawyering Framework in Legal Education” 
(2017) 2017 Intl Rev L 1; Amanda Stickley, “Providing a Law Degree for the ‘Real World’: 
Perspective of an Australian Law School” (2011) 45 L Teacher 63. 











dispute resolution,44  as well as the introduction of practice technologies, such as 
e-discovery.45  While these changes are faculty-dependent and small in scope, this 
adoption refects faculty interest in making technological education relevant to 
practice.46  In addition, elective courses and clinics on technology provide a select 
number of students with the ability to identify legal problems and use technology 
to resolve them. Some clinics train students on the use of established technologies 
(such as those dedicated to e-discovery and legal research and writing).47 Others 
involve the use of authoring software to enhance current applications or design 
new ones. For example, several law schools in the United States have used A2J 
Author software to create apps that turn tacit knowledge held by lawyers into 
information that could be accessed by under-served populations.48 Scholarship 
from faculty members at several schools indicates that students use A2J to master 
substantive and procedural law and identify the social needs of particular client 
groups.49 Tis approach can be compared with eforts to design entirely new 
software packages at Sufolk University Law School, in which students learn to 
generate apps and software.50 Tese types of design courses require students to 
design in tandem with programmers or they teach students how to code. 
44. See Jordan Goldberg, “Online Dispute Resolution and Why Law Schools Should Prepare 
Future Lawyers for the Online Forum” (2014) 14 Pepp Disp Resol L Rev 1; Maebh Harding, 
“Using Interviewing and Negotiation to Further Critical Understanding of Family and 
Child Law” in Caroline Strevens, Richard Grimes & Edward Phillips, eds, Legal Education: 
Simulation in Teory and Practice (Ashgate, 2014) 127. 
45. See Femi Cadmus, “Five Steps to Successfully Developing a Law Practice Technology 
Course” (2014) 24 Trends L Library Mgmt & Tech 25 at 27. 
46. See Richard S Granat & Stephanie Kimbro, “Te Teaching of Law Practice Management 
and Technology in Law Schools: A New Paradigm,” (2013) 88 Chicago-Kent L Rev 757 at 
769-70; Conrad Johnson & Brian Donnelly, “If Only We Knew What We Know” (2013) 88 
Chicago-Kent L Rev 729 at 730. 
47. Brian Sites, “Te Infuence of Algorithms: Te Importance of Tracking Technology as Legal 
Educators” (2016) 23 L Teacher 21. 
48. Johnson & Donnelly, supra note 50. 
49. Ibid. See also Ronald W Staudt & Andrew P Medeiros, “Access to Justice and Technology 
Clinics: A 4% Solution” (2013) 88 Chicago-Kent L Rev 695; Tanina Rostain, Roger 
Skalbeck & Kevin G Mulcahy, “Tinking Like a Lawyer, Designing Like an Architect: 
Preparing Students for the 21st Century Practice” (2013) 88 Chicago-Kent L Rev 743; 
Robert C Blitt & Reece Brassler, “Experiencing Experiential Education: A Faculty-Student 
Perspective on the University of Tennessee College of Law’s Adventure in Access to Justice 
Author” (2016) 50 John Marshall L Rev 11. 
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What these types of courses share is a commitment to using contextual 
learning about technology as a pedagogic tool. As Simon Canick notes, any 
singular use of technology for presentations, communication, discovery, practice 
management, and legal research could be taught as a separate course.51 However, 
in doing so, the courses “lack context.”52 Margaret Martin Barry has summarized 
the benefts of contextual learning succinctly: Clinics provide skills training 
by relating substantive law to competencies, such as “client interviewing and 
counselling, communication, fact investigation, drafting, negotiating…ethics, 
professionalism…problem solving…and social justice.”53 In Best Practices for 
Legal Education, Roy Stuckey et al argue that “context-based education” provides 
this by teaching “theory, doctrine, and analytical skills,” as well as how to produce 
documents, “resolve human problems, and cultivate practical wisdom.”54 
By design or necessity, students in clinics focus, in whole or in part, on the use 
of technology in the legal profession.55 However, despite limited eforts to teach 
some students to use technology, there seems to be little efort to incorporate 
technology into legal education for all. Tere are several explanations for why 
that is the case. 
One of the primary concerns with integrating technology into learning 
is that law students lack the knowledge needed to work with computational 
technology in a meaningful way. For example, Ken Grady, who refects on his 
teaching in the blog, “An Algorithmic Society,” is a proponent of technological 
training. Nonetheless, he argues for limits due to student inability, how quickly 
skills become outdated, and limited space in the curriculum.56 Grady’s comments 
refect concern that students do not have the necessary foundation in math and 
statistics to engage efectively in these courses. Te inference is that course material 
will be either too facile to be of any practical use, or too complex to be accessible. 
Naturally, these concerns are not uniformly held. Drawing on his experiences, 
Daniel W. Linna Jr. argues the opposite: that this knowledge gap is what these 
51. Canick, supra note 2 at 682. 
52. Ibid. 
53. “Practice Ready: Are We Tere Yet?” (2012) Boston College JL & Soc Just 247 at 252. 
54. Best Practices for Legal Education (Clinical Legal Education Association, 2007) at 104. 
55. Deborah Maranville, “Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional Law Curriculum 
Trough Experiential Learning” (2001) 51 J Legal Educ 51 at 53 (optimal learning is 
achieved from context because of interest in the human character of the issues, better 
comprehension of application, and better memory storage). 
56. “What “Teaching Legal Tech” Could Mean” (1 May 2018), online 
(blog): Te Algorithmic Society <medium.com/the-algorithmic-society/ 
what-teaching-legal-tech-could-mean-bf31cf0d4d10>. 




courses address—learning how to use statistical analysis and how to employ the 
tools used to analyse and present that data, such as R, Python, and Tableau.57 
According to him, any increased ability to work with statistical sampling for 
fraud, algorithms for sentencing, data-driven transactions, or advocacy based on 
statistical arguments will be of value to practice.58 Others have raised concerns 
with students’ abilities to complete design projects within a semester and proposed 
solutions to time restrictions. Stadt et al include the use of design software and 
assigning projects with a very narrow scope.59 Tey also advocate strongly for 
focusing on projects that improve access to justice for underserved populations, 
as this involves practice-based skills, including just-in-time learning, intake triage, 
document assembly, and providing legal information to low-income people. 
A second concern with incorporating technology may stem from the refusal 
to bend to what Margaret Tornton calls corporatist and commodifying trends 
in legal education.60 Law schools and their faculty are being asked to train 
students to practice in ways that produce a faster return on investment for law 
frms and the legal market.61 Susan Boyd presents a related concern that a highly 
competitive environment infuenced by corporatism encourages Canadian legal 
education to focus on market outcomes at the expense of education that advances 
critical refection on the law.62 Commentaries like these raise questions as to 
whether a focus on the pragmatics of technology will reproduce a positivist and 
managerial conception of law that students will be ill-equipped to critique or 
change in their future practice. 
Lastly, reticence to embrace technology could stem from an empirical 
question of whether sole and small frm practitioners (i.e., the bulk of the legal 
service market) use emerging technologies. Moreover, even if technology plays 
some role in practice, there is also the question of whether the profession should 
provide such training once in practice, and not in universities. Tere is something 
to be said about the argument that the profession’s diminishing interest in training 
57. “Why Law Students Should Take Quantitative Analysis: Big Data, 
Algorithms, Courtrooms, Code, and Robot Lawyers” (22 October 
2016), online (blog): LegalTech Lever <www.legaltechlever.com/2016/10/ 
law-students-take-quantitative-analysis-big-data-algorithms-courtrooms-code-robot-lawyers>. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Staudt & Medeiros, supra note 54. 
60. “Technocentrism in the Law School: Why the Gender and Colour of Law Remain the Same” 
(1998) 36 Osgoode Hall LJ 369. 
61. Margaret Tornton, “Te Law School, the Market, and the New Knowledge Economy” 
(2009) 10 German LJ 641. 
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entry-level lawyers does not alter the need for universities to focus on teaching 
critical thinking and legal analysis, rather than day-to-day practice skills.63 
Taken on the whole, these three reasons refect some valid reticence about 
broad curricular change. Tis overview does not hope to do justice to the depth 
of thinking that faculty have put into what should be taught in law schools. 
However, it can explain why Canadian law schools have responded to pressure to 
provide technology training by increasing learning opportunities in technology 
for a limited number of interested students, rather than fundamentally altering 
the delivery of doctrinal material. 
II. RYERSON’S PRACTICE CONTRIBUTION—ATTEND TO 
TECHNOLOGY 
Consciousness about how rights are structured through technology should 
raise questions about how to train students to understand, use, and create legal 
technologies that attend to particular social values. Terefore, at the heart of skills 
training is a question about how to teach legal practice as a series of structures 
that reinforce corporate or governmental uses that may not be aligned with 
the principles of justice. Systemic learning is distinguished from other kinds of 
learning by its focus on the structures and systems used to obtain other kinds of 
knowledge.64 In law school, learning about legal systems usually involves students 
in critically analyzing how rules are formulated and implemented so as to generate 
a particular outcome. Faculty use interdisciplinarity to draw out these refections 
and identify how organizations and procedures alter client experience. Instead of 
only learning positivist law, students are asked to question the structures in which 
those laws are situated. 
Systemic learning is also used to teach legal outcomes caused by jurisdictional 
diference. Trans-systemic legal programs at McGill University and the University 
of Victoria are engaged in the same interdisciplinary teaching that permeates legal 
education in Canada but have added a requirement that students learn multiple 
legal systems while doing so. Students in these schools learn common law as well 
as civil and Indigenous law respectively. However, both programs are characterized 
by eforts to teach their students how to understand the systems within which 
63. For a discussion of market forces, see Arthurs, “Law”, supra note 5. 
64. See Max Miller, “Some Teoretical Aspects of Systemic Learning” (2002) 3 
Sozialer Sinn 379. 










law operates as well as how to think across and between those systems.65 Systemic 
learning about law and technology is rationalized where technology alters the 
substance and procedures of law in ways not easily addressed by the mainstays 
of legal analysis. Tis approach draws primarily upon interdisciplinary learning. 
In her work on the future of coding, Dana Remus contends that lawyers who 
lack competence to analyse the structural impact of a given technology are not 
well positioned to deliver critical advocacy.66 Jamie J. Baker similarly argues that, 
without knowing how algorithms generate results, lawyers are left to their own 
devices to evaluate the efects, which ultimately undermines their ability to advise 
and advocate.67 To this way of thinking, lawyers should attend to technology 
as an interdisciplinary arena in which law is situated and experienced. Tese 
commentators identify a common concern: that the  efect of these kinds of 
technologies may be to disempower the legal profession, especially when clients 
need them to advocate in relation to technological impacts. 
Where is Ryerson in all of this? Ryerson has made technology one of the 
pillars of its new law school program and has used central curricular planning 
to ensure technology skills are included.68 In the program, students are taken 
through extended mandatory course work, including intensives in non-legal 
subject areas deemed helpful for practice. Technology factors into this 
practice-based curriculum through two types of learning: (1) user-based learning, 
and (2) innovation-based learning. User-based learning imparts a technical 
capacity to work with existing technologies and to analyse the efects of uptake. 
Innovation-based learning shows students how to think about the design and 
65. In Canada, the law schools at McGill University and University of Victoria stand out in 
their attempts to centrally design systemic thinking in the legal curriculum in an efort 
to teach their students both how to understand the systems within which common, civil , 
and Indigenous law operate, as well as how to think across and between those systems. 
For discussion of McGill’s experience, see Helge Dedek & Armand de Mestral “Born to 
Be Wild: Te Trans-systemic Programme at McGill and the De-Nationalization of Legal
Education” (2009) 10 German LJ 889; Patrick H Glenn, “Doin’ Te Transsystemic” (20 05) 
50 McGill LJ 86. For discussion of University of Victoria’s experience, see Hadley Friedl and 
& Val Napoleon, “Gathering the Treads: Developing a Methodology for Researching a nd 
Rebuilding Indigenous Legal Traditions” (2015) 1 Lakehead LJ 16; John Borrows, “Out sider 
Education: Indigenous Law and Land Based Learning” (2016) 33 Windsor YB Access Ju st 1; 
Sarah Morales, “Locating Oneself in One’s Research: Learning and Engaging with Law i n the 
Coast Salish World” (2018) 30 J Women & L 144. 
66. Remus, supra note 15. 
67. “Beyond the Information Age: Te Duty of Technology Competence in the Algorithmic
Society” (2018) 69 SCL Rev 557. 
68. For similar recommendations, see Michael R Cassidy, “Reforming the Law School from the 
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adoption of new technologies. When these learning approaches are provided in 
combination with positivist and constructivist approaches, students should be 
better trained to identify instances where the core outcomes of a given law are 
altered by procedural or computational technologies. 
A. USER-BASED LEARNING 
User learning is driven by the need to prepare students to use technologies 
already developed and relevant to practice. Tese may include processes and 
forms commonly used for court flings or regulatory approvals (“low-tech”) as 
well as digital and computational methods (“high-tech”). Learning involves 
incorporating technology usage in the curriculum, outlined below. 
Like most law programs, Ryerson’s frst-year curriculum requires students 
to enroll in courses such as contracts, torts, property, criminal, constitutional, 
and administrative law. In this frst year, profciency in issue identifcation, rule 
identifcation, and rule application is ensured through traditional legal training. 
However, frst year classes are also co-taught by practitioners who introduce 
students to practice applications. Examples could include teaching frst year 
contract law in conjunction with a contract that students re-write,69 and property 
law in conjunction with electronic fling under the Personal Property Security 
Act.70 Tis undertaking refects a broader shift to include transactional learning 
in the legal curriculum early and often.71 
Two technology intensives in frst and second year provide hands-on 
training in technology-related skills considered essential to professional success. 
Te technology innovation intensive introduces students to technological 
entrepreneurship and design. Te coding intensive teaches students how data 
analytics are used to devise a solution to a specifc problem and to use basic 
programming software to design it.
 Ryerson’s commitment to technological learning is also refected in its 
inclusion of technology-related skills as a national entry to practice competency, 
which includes the ability to: 
69. See Glenn D West, “Teaching Contract Drafting through Caselaw—A Syllabus and A 
Collection of My Musings about Contract Drafting Based upon Recent Cases” (29 August 
2017), online (pdf ): <www.ssrn.com/abstract=3028971>. 
70. RSO 1990, c P.10. 
71. See Craig Scott, “A Core Curriculum for the Transnational Legal Education of JD and LLB 
students: Surveying the Approach of the International, Comparative and Transnational Law 
Program at Osgoode Hall Law School” (2005) 23 Penn St Intl L Rev 757. 
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a. Review options, analyze requirements, evaluate and apply technological 
solutions to legal issues 
b. Apply relevant tools, such as artifcial intelligence and quantitative legal 
prediction, to conduct data analytics in a range of legal contexts 
c. Display digital literacy by communicating with technology professionals to 
exercise options and efectively communicate digital needs and strategies for 
solving legal problems 
d. Apply digital literacy to conduct business process analysis (i.e. analyze 
technology architecture, evaluate options and select the best alternative).72 
Select second year courses in Business Law and Civil Procedure at Ryerson are 
organized around intensive doctrinal learning and simulated practice. Students 
work in groups of seven as part of a simulated frm and produce practice-appropriate 
work related to two key subjects. Simulations in these courses help students to 
use doctrine in combination with practice technologies. For example, students 
are trained in how to use “low-tech” technologies in legal practice, including 
Word, Excel, PDF, and Google Docs, in addition to legal technologies that are 
the mainstay of legal practice (Quicklaw and Westlaw). Even training on how 
to take efective legal notes (i.e., interview notes, discovery notes, et cetera) on 
laptops would signal curricular change.73 Canick notes that word processing and 
PowerPoint appear so basic that most schools overlook training, but frms report 
that students begin practice without a sophisticated ability to use them.74 
Where students use a technology to achieve an outcome for a simulated 
client or assignment, they become familiar with that particular program. 
E-discovery simulations illustrate this type of training. Students might review 
documents, cases, best practice guides and ethics rules, plan conferences, use 
e-discovery rules, prepare interrogatories, and draft discovery requests and replies 
that refect a range of digital sources.75 Properly planned, this sample exercise 
refects what Deborah Maranville calls spiral education: the provision of multiple 
72. Canadian Common Law Program Approval Committee, Report on Application by Ryerson 
University for Approval of Proposed Law School Program (Federation of Law Societies 
Canada, 2017) at 152. 
73. Canick, supra note 2. 
74. See Monica Goyal, “Tech Competence a Must” (1 September 2017), online: 
Canadian Lawyer <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/tech-competence-a-
must/274463>; Catherine Sanders Reach, “Essential Tech Skills for the New Lawyer” 
(2 November 2017), online (blog): Before the Bar <abaforlawstudents.com/2017/11/02/ 
essential-tech-skills-for-the-new-lawyer>. 
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opportunities to train in the overlap between doctrine and practice in relation 
to a topic area.76 
Te main concern with user-based learning is that it can operate at the 
expense of other valuable lessons.77 Repetitive, systemized practice is not often 
associated with the type of critical and creative thinking needed to be an excellent 
advocate.78 While it seems obvious that too strong a focus on technology use 
could degenerate into a series of “how-to” courses, it is not an inevitable result. 
As Justice Lorne Sossin, former Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School, argued, 
“experiential education has the potential to promote critical thinking about 
law and the impact of markets more efectively than its classroom doctrinal or 
theoretical counterparts.”79 Te difculty is how to make room in the curriculum 
to include a more thoughtful approach. 
Tis is where systemic learning has a role to play. Systemic approaches broaden 
out advocacy in relation to the use of technology itself. For example, a doctrinal 
approach to teaching technology might be used to address problematic patterns 
in a feedback loop that impacts established rights otherwise protected by law. 
Students can be taught to generate legal arguments that reassert the privilege of a 
rights-holder in that program or provide interpretations of related doctrine that 
explain why the interests of other stakeholders should be privileged.80 
Teaching students to identify the legal impacts of technology is also be 
achieved through writing, programming, and oral advocacy that promotes 
socio-legal analysis. A socio-legal (or, “constructivist”) approach requires students 
to delve deeply into the law’s efect to understand its systemic characteristics. 
It turns attention to the non-legal contexts in which law operates (or fails to 
operate).81 Paul Maharg implements programs aimed at transactional realism 
76. Maranville, supra note 60. 
77. See Harry W Arthurs, “Te Political Economy of Canadian Legal Education” (1998) 25 JL 
& Soc’y 14; Harry W Arthurs, “Poor Canadian Legal Education: So Near to Wall Street, 
So Far From God” (2001) 38 Osgoode Hall LJ 381; Harry W Arthurs, “Te State We’re In: 
Legal Education in Canada’s New Political Economy” (2001) 20 Windsor YB Access Just 35. 
78. See Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: report to 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada/by the Consultative Group on 
Research and Education in Law (Information Division of Te Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada, 1983). 
79. “Experience the Future of Legal Education” (2014) 51 Alta L Rev 849 at 856. 
80. See Kieran Tranter, “Te Law and Technology Enterprise: Uncovering the Template to Legal 
Scholarship on Technology” (2011) 3 L Innovation & Tech 31. 
81. See e.g. Jerome Frank, “Why not a Clinical Lawyer-School?” (1933) 81 U Pa L Rev 907; 
Jerome Frank, “What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?” (1933) 19 ABA J 723. 













to a similar end.82 A typical approach would involve producing law (including 
guidelines, policies, forms, and processes) based on an analysis of stakeholder 
need, rather than resorting solely to precedent. 
Science and Technology scholars have long refected on these operational 
contexts in their descriptions of how law operates and impacts others.83 For 
example, Sheila Jasanof uses an institutional lens to describe how law is used 
to articulate societal needs and shape scientifc outputs.84 Laurence Tribe uses 
environmental assessment to provide an institutional approach to describing law’s 
efect on regulation and expert practice.85 Other scholars have sought to describe 
the opposite—how law is shaped by society’s processes.86 For example, network 
theory is often used to provide deep descriptions of scientifc actors87 who impact 
law.88 Moreover, law is often interpreted in order to address technology’s impacts. 
For example, Robert A. Hillman and Jefrey J. Rachlinski argued that the internet 
did not fundamentally alter the theories of blanket assent that underpin the 
interpretation of standard form consumer contracts.89 However, they noted the 
medium can have a unique efect on factors that normally impact interpretation: 
the lack of social contact, the way marketing and contracting are blended online, 
and changes to cognitive decision making.90 
82. See Transforming Legal Education: Learning and Teaching the Law in the Early Twenty-frst 
Century (Ashgate, 2007) at 14. 
83. Tis approach has usually been fueled by scholarship associated with the study of science 
and technology. 
84. See Ronald Brickman, Sheila Jasanof & Tomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: Te Politics of 
Regulation in Europe and the United States (Cornell University Press, 1985); Sheila Jasanof, 
Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Twentieth Century Fund, 1997); 
Alex Faulkner, Bettina Lange & Christopher Lawless, “Introduction: Material Worlds: 
Intersections of Law, Science, Technology, and Society” (2012) 39 JL & Soc’y 1. 
85. Laurence H Tribe, Channeling Technology Trough Law (Bracton Press, 1973). 
86. See generally, Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, translated by Klaus Ziegert (Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Gunther Teubner, “How the Law Tinks: Toward a Constructivist 
Epistemology of Law” (1989) 23 L & Soc’y Rev 727; Gunther Teubner, Law as an 
Autopoietic System (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
87. “Scientifc Objects and Legal Objectivity” in Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy, eds, Law, 
Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Tings (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 73. See also Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, “Studying Law by 
Association: Bruno Latour Goes to the Conseil d’État” (2008) 33 Law & Soc Inquiry 805. 
88. “Te Architecture of Authority: Te Place of Law in the Space of Science” in Austin 
Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey, eds, Te Place of Law (University of 
Michigan Press, 2003) 75. 
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In this approach, practice technologies are used in combination with social 
science methodologies to provide students with a critical understanding of the 
law–technology interface. Students can use these descriptions to identify social 
needs and convert them to political and ethical claims about the way law should 
be accessed or implemented. 
Simulation in second year is also meant to scale up the learning students 
traditionally obtain through legal clinics. On the job, students must familiarize 
themselves with the substantive law needed to ofer advice as well as become 
profcient in the procedural and documentary requirements of practice.91 Naturally, 
simulation is not the same as clinical learning, which will be undertaken by 
students in their third-year placements. As Karen Barton, Patricia McKellar, and 
Paul Maharg point out about their own experience with transactional learning, 
simulation cannot replicate the authenticity of real clinical work.92 Nonetheless, 
the authors describe successful outcomes where drafters constantly attend to 
the learning objectives and capabilities needed to mimic authentic practice. 
Te detailed insights of those using simulation will be helpful in reviewing and 
revising the technology learning outcomes Ryerson will undertake. 
B. INNOVATION-BASED LEARNING 
In contrast to user-based learning, innovation-based learning involves students 
in designing processes, forms, digital systems, and computational methodologies 
for social good. Innovation training is supported by Ryerson through mandatory 
technology courses: Data, Code, and Social Innovation and Access to Justice and 
Technology. Both involve students in design but require learning diferent skills.
 In Data, Code and Social Innovation, students identify an emerging legal 
problem through data analysis. Te emphasis is on recognizing client needs, 
identifying problems, and using data analytics and knowledge generation 
software to generate multi-faceted solutions. A focus on social innovation refects 
a shift in legal education to problem solving, community engagement, law 
reform, and innovation for social good.93 However, this course requires students 
to draw on big data sets to analyse social problems and relevant solutions to 
achieve these ends. Students will therefore analyse socio-legal scholarship and 
91. See e.g. Patience A Crowder, “Designing a Transactional Law Clinic for Life-Long Learning” 
(2015) 19 Lewis & Clark L Rev 413. 
92. “Authentic Fictions: Simulation, Professionalism and Legal Learning” (2007) 14 
Clinical L Rev 143. 
93. See e.g. Duke Law, “Center on Law & Technology,” online: <law.duke.edu/dclt> (for an 
example of curriculum and courses on law and technology at Duke Law). 
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undertake stakeholder interviews, but also use legal analytics—an approach 
that draws on several data-based technologies that fnd patterns in data sets and 
forecasts future needs. 
In the second course, Access to Justice and Technology, students will 
identify barriers to justice, propose solutions, and critically evaluate them. With 
an emphasis on accessible technology, students will design solutions aimed at 
making legal services more afordable for individuals and organizations of limited 
means. Tis orients students towards creative processes as a foundational way to 
approach law. Like other programs with similar courses,94 Access to Justice and 
Technology will have students use econometrics and machine learning for design 
and use authoring software to develop prototypes.95 
Lastly, innovation training will be buttressed by the experience and 
opportunities provided by Ryerson’s Legal Innovation Zone (LIZ) and the 
Cyber-Security Catalyst at Ryerson. Te LIZ is Ryerson’s startup incubator that 
supports legal tech entrepreneurship. Te Catalyst acts as a source of cybersecurity 
training and policy development. Both entities have developed curricula aimed at 
technology and law. 
To be realistic, it is likely that only a few law students in the program will go on 
to design new technologies upon graduation. However, iterative experimentation 
in the classroom treats innovation as a discipline that teaches students to fnd the 
right problems to solve, develop solutions  through prototypes, test them, and 
convince others to use them. 
Tis approach has several potential learning outcomes. One outcome of 
innovation learning is that it teaches students to better service clients who are 
innovators or are impacted by innovation. While lawyers will continue to use to 
basic legal principles, representation will be limited if they do not understand 
how the fner points of a technology work. Programs that give primacy to 
one interpretation over another involve judges in evaluating technological 
design. Advocacy therefore requires lawyers capable of explaining to courts the 
impacts of program design on legal rights and policy preferences.96 With design 
94. Staudt & Medeiros, supra note 54. 
95. For a course taught at Columbia Law School, see Joshua Mitts, “Data and Predictive Coding 
for Lawyers” (January 2019), online: Columbia Law School <www.law.columbia.edu/ 
academics/courses/24238. See also Aaron Goodman, “Predictive Coding: A Better Way to 
Deal with Electronically Stored Information” (2016) 43 Litigation 23. For a similar course 
description, see Jonathan Koehler, “Quantitative Reasoning in the Law” (May 2019), online: 
Northwestern University: Pritzker School of Law <www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/ 
curricular-oferings/coursecatalog/details.cfm?CourseID=1269>. 
96. Kroll et al, supra note 33. 
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experience, lawyers should be better trained to advocate for competing rights and 
entitlements created by software programs.97 
Lack of technical capacity to explain and advocate for changes to technology 
is a particular challenge for those tasked with meeting stakeholder goals.98 For 
example, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat has noted that the government 
will continue to adopt emerging technologies in its service and management 
practices. However, should it adopt these technologies without hiring employees 
capable of understanding, evaluating, and explaining them, it will be reliant on 
the technical capacity of the private sector. With the private sector in control, 
governments and the public will become increasingly beholden to paying costs 
dictated by a small group of providers and complying with the sector’s competitive 
interests to keep source code unavailable for widespread scrutiny.99 
Smart contracts, which self-execute and supposedly limit the dependency 
on lawyers, illustrate this gap in the private sector. Tere remain outstanding 
questions about the data points and conditions upon which those contracts 
self-execute. Te verifcation methods implicate the need for analysts to evaluate 
the technology’s value to diferent types of contracting parties and stakeholders. 
Lawyers able to analyse the legal implications of complex algorithms and improve 
them therefore serve an important function in an automated future. 
A second outcome of innovation learning that attends to systemic efects 
could be to provide students with the opportunity to be innovators themselves. 
As used here, the term “legal innovation” is implicitly tied to creativity and design 
thinking. Jeanne Liedtka, Randy Salzman, and Daisy Azer defne design thinking 
as “a problem-solving approach with a unique set of qualities: it is human 
centred, possibility driven, option focused, and iterative.”100 Rather than confne 
notions of innovation to big breakthroughs by exceptional people, they foresee a 
future where everyone can use design thinking as a common language by which 
to solve problems. Tis encourages distinct shifts in mindsets and behaviours 
towards democratized design. It is not only about the design of products, 
97. Tranter, supra note 92. 
98. See Responsible Artifcial Intelligence in the Government of Canada, version 2, Digital 
Disruption White Paper Series (TBCS, 10 April 2018), online: <docs.google.com/ 
document/d/1Sn-qBZUXEUG4dVk909eSg5qvfbpNlRhzIefWPtBwbxY/edit#> [Responsible 
Artifcal Intelligence]. For discussion in relation to legal practice, see Law Society of 
Ontario, “Practice Management Guidelines on Technology,” online: <lso.ca/lawyers/ 
practice-supports-and-resources/practice-management-guidelines/technology>. 
99. Responsible Artifcial Intelligence, supra note 115 at 29. 
100. Design Tinking for the Greater Good: Innovation in the Social Sector (Columbia University 
Press, 2017) at 6. 






or even user experience. It is a problem-solving process that complements other 
professional methodologies. 
Scholars, such as Paul Gowder, take up this call for democratized design 
in advocacy for collective action as a design principle. Rather than build 
innovations that make legal confict cheaper and supposedly more accessible, 
Gowder advocates for tools that can advance a more egalitarian access to justice. 
He illustrates his point by comparing technologies that make highly invasive 
practices by powerful actors more efcient versus those that use data to promote 
collective action. Examples of accessible technologies are the Miranda App, 
which provides suspects with a computerized message,101 or smart city schemes 
that authorize extensive surveillance in exchange for market access.102 In contrast, 
collective action technologies involve creative thinking about overcoming 
disincentives to individual action. For example, Gowder conceives of a service that 
allows cancellation of automated standard form contracts (e.g., phone contracts) 
with discriminatory clauses where a critical mass of claimants is reached.103 Tis 
aims to overcome a company’s disinterest in individual cancellations but intense 
interest in large-scale cancellation. Gowder sees this as an abstraction of the class 
action; a technology that allows individuals to overcome impediments to access 
through collective action. 
A third outcome of innovation learning that attends to systemic efects would 
be to train students to be critical users of innovation. Teaching innovation in a law 
school requires attention to the aims of innovative design and who will assume 
its costs and benefts. Studies on design thinking and governance illustrate these 
processes.104 For example, in a recent study by Brian McInnis et al, the authors 
document their use of crowdsourcing law and policy to rethink crowd-civic 
systems.105 In their workshop, they used design thinking to address both the 
opportunities and challenges of crowd-civic systems to develop best practices for 
public engagement with law and policy.106 Tis study focused attention on several 
101. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Richard A Leo, “Te Miranda App: Metaphor and 
Machine” (2017) 97 BUL Rev 935. 
102. See Jathan Sadowski & Frank Pasquale, “Te spectrum of control: A social theory of the 
smart city” (2015) 20 First Monday, online: <frstmonday.org/article/view/5903/4660>. 
103. Supra note 2. 
104. See Michael Howlett, “From the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ policy design: design thinking beyond 
markets and collaborative governance” (2014) 47 Policy Sciences 187. 
105. “Crowdsourcing Law and Policy: A Design-Tinking Approach to Crowd-Civic Systems” in 
Companion of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social 
Computing, Portland, February 2017 (Association for Computing Machinery, 2017). 
106. Ibid. 
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key questions, such as whose views are prioritized in crowd-civic systems, how 
the results are used, how results from diferent systems can be compared, what 
barriers and risks exist, et cetera. 
III. CONCLUSION 
To train lawyers to provide the same legal service that generations of lawyers 
have provided is necessary but not sufcient for future practice. Incorporating 
technology (as a tool, as a discourse, and as a social lens) into legal education 
seems to be the way to move beyond the current model. Creating space in the 
legal curriculum to deliver a systemic approach to law and technology is key to 
developing critical thinking about legal service and the production of law.107 
Tere is great skepticism that technology training can be incorporated 
into legal education in a way that makes real change. However, forestalling 
curriculum reform implicates law schools in the formation of technology and 
law as an elite practice area. As it stands now, claims involving technology require 
the involvement of computer scientists and programmers who understand law 
and legal obligations, or alternatively, lawyers who understand programming. 
A future where so few can understand both means that the practice of law and 
technology will remain the purview of an elite few. 
What is happening at Ryerson is not simply a pragmatic efort to train 
students to service clients more efciently. Once one begins to approach the 
idea that law is deeply implicated in the technology, then what is at stake is the 
essential role that lawyers play as advocates in relation to those technologies. 
Terefore, layered into Ryerson’s program is a symbiotic efort to explore how 
to teach legal innovation and how to teach those who will be at the forefront of 
understanding its efects. 
107. For example, in response to the demand for interdisciplinary research in this feld, 
New York University has launched the AI Now Institute, a research center dedicated to 
examining the social implications of artifcial intelligence. Te Ethics and Governance of 
Artifcial Intelligence Initiative, a hybrid research efort and philanthropic fund led jointly 
by the Berkman Klein Center at Harvard University and the MIT Media Lab, is another 
example of academic development in the feld. See AI Now Institute, “AI Now,” online: 
<ainowinstitute.org>; “Te Ethics and Governance of Artifcial Intelligence Initiative,” 
online: <aiethicsinitiative.org>; Christopher Bavitz & Kira Hessekiel, “Algorithms 
and Justice: Examining the role of the state in the development and deployment of 
algorithmic technologies” (11 July 2018), online: Berkman Klein Center <cyber.harvard. 
edu/story/2018-07/algorithms-and-justice>; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, 
“CIFAR Pan-Canadian Artifcial Intelligence Strategy” online: <www.cifar.ca/ai/ 
pan-canadian-artifcial-intelligence-strategy>. 
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It is early days yet. Nevertheless, at the core of the program already lies an 
undertaking to engage with legal technology in practice—but never be limited in 
defning what that might mean. 
